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Reading Polanyi in Erbil: Understanding Socio-Political Factors in 
the Development of Iraqi Kurdistan 
Robert Smith 
 
The Kurdistan Regional Government emerges out of the chaos of post-Saddam Iraq as a 
rare positive, providing both political stability and economic growth. However, the outward 
display masks a more complex domestic settlement where the trappings of the free market 
coexist with political parties who are significant economic actors. How can this model of 
development in Iraqi Kurdistan be explained? Turning to the writings of political economist 
Karl Polanyi, does his thinking on relations between society and economy offer a way to 
unpack the development? And what does this analysis tell us of prospects for Iraqi 
Kurdistan?  
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The ‘success’ of Iraqi Kurdistan has been a recurrent theme in the retelling of its recent 
past. Prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 Kurdistan was presented by advocates of ‘regime 
change’ as the prosperous and peaceful future for post-Saddam Iraq (Ferguson 2008: 8-
9). After regime change, as the rest of Iraq descended into lawlessness and violent civil 
war, Kurdistan appeared as a location blessed with security and political stability. Since 
1991, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) had taken opportunities presented to it 
and a burst of economic activity has transformed the region’s capital, Erbil, from a compact 
city clustered around an ancient citadel to an urban sprawl boasting an international 
airport, shopping malls, gated communities, and luxury hotels. The KRG supported a 
campaign to market the region as a tourist destination under the heading of ‘The Other 
Iraq’ (Kamen 2006). As civil war eased, the KRG became a centre for investment and 
business, particularly in the oil and gas sector, where in 2012 it was declared the 
‘exploration capital of the world’ (Kent 2012). When Islamic State emerged as an 
existential threat to the future of both the KRG and Iraq, it was once again the security 
forces of Kurdistan that stepped up to face down the foe. Then-Presidential candidate 
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Donald Trump declared that he was ‘a big fan of the Kurdish forces’ (New York Times 
2016). However, this success may be coming to an end. In late 2017, the KRG was 
entering a period of crisis that threatened to reverse the gains of the previous twenty-five 
years. An independence referendum that resulted in a significant ‘yes’ vote ultimately gave 
rise to the Iraqi federal government reasserting its right to decide the future of the Iraqi 
state and its Kurdistan territory. The expulsion of Kurdish peshmerga from Kirkuk in 
October 2017 sealed a humiliating defeat for the KRG and threatened the future of the 
regional government (Hiltermann 2017). 
How did the KRG move from success to crisis? Contrasted with the rest of the 
country, Khalil noted a narrative of Kurdistan exceptionalism: in ‘the mixed report card on 
Iraqi progress, one consistent theme is that Iraqi Kurdistan has been a quiet success story 
. . . a snowy oasis, free from the sectarian strife that has marred the rest of the country’ 
(Khalil 2009). As Leezenberg noted, on first viewing, Kurdistan appeared to be, ‘the 
neoliberal success story of post-Saddam Iraq’ (Leezenberg 2005: 631). These perceptions 
of success informed writings on how KRG had utilised its own nationalist history in the 
development of a resilient notion of statehood (Richards and Smith 2015): However, as 
others have also noted, when looked at closely, the narrative of a successful Kurdistan is 
more complicated (Jabary and Hira 2013). It would take a selective view of events not to 
notice some of the limitations of the politics, governance and economics in the territory. 
The much-trumpeted democracy of Kurdistan ran alongside the longstanding dominance 
of two political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK), who ruled their respective sections of the region as personal fiefdoms. 
Freedom of speech coexisted with the violent suppression of protest and the arresting of 
journalists. In the economic sphere dynamism coexisted with allegations of ‘nepotism and 
corruption’ (Ahmed 2012: 110). Kurdistan is complex and this raises the question of how 
to understand its development. 
A more nuanced perspective of Kurdistan’s development must highlight that the 
successes, and some of the failures, of the region, were also closely linked to the dominant 
role played by the two principal political parties of the region. Deeper still, the analysis 
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must consider the role of the two families that led these parties. To understand the political 
economy of Kurdistan, it is necessary to comprehend its political settlement and the social 
relations that enabled them: the economic and the political cannot be separated. To unpick 
the puzzle of the success of Kurdistan, while also considering its future development, 
theoretical guidance is required. 
To help with unpacking this, the writings of Karl Polanyi act as a useful tool. Kari 
Polanyi Levitt summarises her father’s work as ‘addressing the relationship of the market 
to the whole of society, including institutions of political governance’ (Polanyi Levitt 2017: 
390). Of interest in Polanyi’s work is his emphasis on the relations between society and 
economy reflected in his historical analysis of ‘archaic’ economies. Do these works provide 
a new way of understanding the contemporary settlement in Iraqi Kurdistan? The 
dominant narrative of Iraqi Kurdistan is that it represents a success story and an exemplar 
of a modern dynamic market economy. However, closer inspection through the prism of 
Polanyi highlights the historical development of state and economy, providing a more 
nuanced grounding that is needed not only to explain Kurdistan today, but also to provide 
clues to its future trajectory.   
The purpose here is not to engage in an in-depth examination of Polanyi's work, 
but to use the insights of Polanyi to contribute to the analysis of the economic and political 
development of KRG. This article first considers characterisations of the state in the Middle 
East before going on to look at the development of Kurdistan within the modern history of 
Iraq. Polanyi’s work on the political economy of Mesopotamia will be deployed as a way of 
understanding the role of the dominant political parties in modern-day Kurdistan.  
 
Ancient and Modern: Politics and Society in the Middle East 
Before analysing the contemporary settlement of Kurdistan it is necessary to establish 
some groundwork for how Polanyi and others have characterised politics and society in 
the Middle East. Looking for evidence of economic activity outside of the market, Polanyi 
had researched ancient Mesopotamia and the development of the economy in pre-modern 
times. A model that was advanced during this research with Assyriologist Leo Oppenheim 
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emphasised the importance of ‘palaces and temples’ as centres of influence (Oppenheim 
1957: 31) Local economies were ‘dominated by large palace and temple complexes, which 
owned the greater part of the arable land and virtually monopolised anything that can be 
called “industrial production” as well as foreign trade’ (Dale 2010: 149 quoting Finley). 
Polanyi observed that trade in this setting ‘was not a two-sided act resulting in a negotiated 
contract but a sequence of one-sided declarations of will.’ These interactions taking place 
‘within the frame of a governmental organisation and a network of official and semi-official 
institutions.’ (Polanyi 1957: 22-23) Dale notes that the analysis put forward by Polanyi on 
ancient Mesopotamia was ‘less successful than his other forays into comparative economic 
history’ (Dale 2010: 150-2). However, for Polanyi, the importance of the palaces in the 
ancient economic structures was that they stood apart from the subsistence level of 
economics that characterised the dominant economic sector, agriculture.  
What the palaces allowed for was the creation of surpluses that could be pushed 
into the ‘public’ sector. As Dale notes, this upends the models of development that see 
‘small private scale’ trade expand to a ‘larger, and ultimately public, scale.’ The reverse 
happens whereby the palaces create surpluses allowing for investment, capital 
accumulation, and ultimately entrepreneurial innovation (Dale 2010: 159-60). Hudson 
states this results in the capturing of the commanding heights of the economy by 
individuals in the palaces: ‘Rulers and their bureaucracies . . . behaved simultaneously in 
public and private ways. Their “public” position could readily be transmuted into private 
advantage, the temple and palace officials exploiting their powers for personal material 
gain’ (Dale 2010: 160 quoting Hudson). During these periods of palace rule, ‘significant 
privatisation dynamics were in play, centred on the palace bureaucracy.’ Eventually, these 
periods of development controlled from the centre would pass as the economic activity 
created the environment in which ‘public business activity regained its customary upper 
hand’ (Dale 2010: 151-2 quoting Oppenheim). 
Echoes of Polanyi’s research into pre-modern Mesopotamia can be found in 
contemporary accounts of the state in the Arab world. Ayubi argues that how a state 
organised itself and what values it espoused reflected the economics, society, and culture 
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of the region. One of the factors that made the state in the Middle East different for Ayubi 
was the basis of its economy, which was described as ‘the tributary mode of production’ 
(Ayubi 1995: 58). Initially the economy was dominated by agriculture, tribute was 
extracted from tribes by central authorities. The role of the state in this process was one 
of ‘distribution and circulation’ of the tributes (Ayubi 1995: 58). Through this practice, 
classes become ‘excessively dependent on the state,’ and the success or survival of a class 
was dependent on their relationship with the state. This process and the resulting 
relationships inform the organisation of the state. Therefore, according to Ayubi, ‘. . . 
politics in such a society is not characterised by the orderly process of aggregating 
demands but by acts of capturing the state and acts of resisting the state’ (Ayubi 1995: 
25). Given the centrality of the state to the political process and individual prosperity that 
is linked with it, those who achieve power work hard to hold on to it, becoming consumed 
by strategies for maintaining it, with the individual or group who challenges the status quo 
viewed as ‘a threat.’ The result is that states are strong in terms of coercion but often 
weak in terms of popular support and legitimacy (Ayubi 1995: 23). Ayubi argues that as 
the Arab state expanded in size and scope, the space for these non-state opponents 
diminished. Colonial rule simply inherited and then refined these techniques (Ayubi 1995: 
24). 
Both theoretical accounts of the state, ancient and modern, emphasise the 
dominance of central authority. With the ‘palaces and temples’, change is gradual as the 
economic forces unleashed slowly replace the existing order. With Ayubi’s model, 
opposition to the dominant order is suppressed and change relies on a confrontation over 
reform. In Iraq, confrontation to the existing order came with the revolution in 1958. 
However, the revolution proved more effective at changing the leadership of the 
centralised state rather than altering its structure. The growing economic importance of 
the oil sector allowed the state to expand in ‘size and scope’ but the centralisation of power 
remained. As Davis notes when describing the Baath Party seizure of power in 1968 the 
‘[Iraqi] political system failed to develop enduring political institutions . . . [w]ithout 
political institutionalisation, politics reverted back to subnational groups based on tribal, 
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ethnic or regional identities’ (Davis 2005: 153). There was no incentive for rulers to move 
away from this model of statehood and it remained in place, growing ‘more exclusionary 
and more tightly consolidated’ (Ayubi 1995: 426). Therefore, it can be stated that the 
historical development of the Iraqi state had resulted in the intertwining of social, 
economic and political structures: a system that favoured limited circles of power based 
on tribalism, ethnicity, and regionalism. Power resides in these relations.  
Polanyi aids in deciphering the economic and the political: ‘. . . the anthropologist, 
the sociologist or the historian in his study of the place occupied by the economy in human 
society was faced with a great variety of institutions other than markets, in which the 
sphere of man’s livelihood was embedded’ (Polanyi 1953/1959: 218). In the case of Iraqi 
Kurdistan, the variety of institutions are less about the state and more about the role of 
political parties. The domination by political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan resulted in the 
ascendancy of two families, where the sphere of economic development and political 
control can be located. To understand the development of Kurdistan, these relations must 
be considered. 
 
Becoming Kurdistan: Political tribes and tribal politics 
As Polanyi states, analysis requires historical perspective. The modern history of Iraq 
begins with the attempt to map out a national identity for the new territory. The irony of 
this was that as Iraq sought to establish its own identity a coherent nationality was already 
being articulated in the Kurdish-dominated north of the country. The British government, 
ruling the territory under the mandate system, was already reporting in the mid-1920s 
that Kurdish engagement with the political processes of the mandate was driven by a 
‘desire to get British support for a Kurdistan free from Turkish influence than any solidarity 
with the Iraqi government: many Kurds still hankered after a wholly independent 
Kurdistan’ (Sluglett 2007: 63). As the new state of Iraq took shape the British incorporated 
both coercion and economic incentive to gain sufficient control over the territory to fulfil 
the mandate. Inspired by the model of rule used in India, the British sought out and, in 
some cases revived, tribal groupings to provide cost-efficient governance. The tribal 
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leaders fulfilled the dual role of landlords and law enforcement. They were the ‘socio-
political backbone’ of mandate-era Iraq (Ayubi 1995: 95). This created opportunities for 
local tribal leaders to either cooperate or oppose colonial rule. In Kurdistan, local tribal 
leaders worked to maintain their autonomy of action from the British and from central 
powers (Tripp 2002: 34-6). In the 1930s, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, of the Barzani tribe, 
emerged as the leader of Kurdish resistance to rule from Baghdad. Driven by the desire 
to maintain the autonomy of his tribe, but also influenced by an emergent Kurdish 
nationalism, he would maintain this position until his death in 1979 (Sluglett 2007: 152). 
Most interesting to note from this period of state formation in Kurdistan was the 
struggle between nationalism and tribalism in the disputes with Baghdad and the British. 
The tribal groups, linked as they often were to the ownership of land, could be conservative 
groupings resistant to radical reforms. But in Kurdistan, their desire for autonomy made 
them actors for change. When Barzani led a revolt against the wartime control of the 
British in 1943 it marked a turning point in the politics of Kurdistan. Stansfield notes that 
this revolt was the point when, if ‘Barzani did not choose nationalism, the nationalists 
chose him . . . [f]rom 1943 onwards, it is increasingly apparent that the nationalists are 
less inclined to be used as pawns in tribal politics, and attempt to exploit tribalism for their 
own agenda’ (Stansfield 2003: 63). The nationalist political narrative was formalised in 
the creation of the KDP in 1946, with Mullah Mustafa Barzani named as its President-in-
exile.  
The KDP would dominate the politics of Kurdistan nationalism for the next thirty 
years. During this period there were significant advances for the Kurdish cause within Iraq. 
The revolution of 1958 produced a constitutional settlement that recognised that Iraq was 
both an Arab and a Kurdish state. Barzani could return from exile to lead the KDP from 
Iraqi Kurdistan, but there was no immediate transfer of power from Baghdad to Erbil in 
this new era. As under previous rulers, the Iraqi Kurds became an irritant for the 
government of Baghdad as a series of conflicts unfolded. During this period, whichever 
group found itself in power in Iraq recognised that it would struggle to bring a military 
solution to the Kurdish question. Equally true for the Kurds was the fact that they alone 
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did not command sufficient power to force a solution on Baghdad (Sluglett and Farouk-
Sluglett 2003: 81). 
The early 1970s was a difficult but significant period in the development of the 
modern KRG. In 1970, Baghdad had agreed to allow for autonomy in the territory where 
a majority Kurdish community existed. This began the process of establishing the reach of 
the contemporary KRG. However, when progress towards this goal stalled, Barzani once 
again took up arms. The military defeat that KDP forces suffered in 1975 was calamitous. 
In its aftermath, a split occurred within the nationalist movement. In June 1975, the PUK 
was established to pursue a more overtly revolutionary path towards Kurdish autonomy. 
The new party was led by Jalal Talabani and inspired by the actions of ‘Third World’ 
liberation movements. The PUK set itself out as a left-wing party that contested the 
traditional conservatism of the KDP and its tribal leadership. The PUK rejected ‘the right 
of an individual family, the Barzanis, to head the Kurdish national movement’ (Stansfield 
2003: 86). The division that the PUK highlighted was not only political but was also 
cultural, a divide between the urban and rural, the modern and the traditional. Stansfield 
notes that this ‘enhanced segmentation' of the area would remain as ‘a major obstacle to 
the unification of the region’ and of its governance (Stansfield 2003: 86). However, despite 
the PUK rejecting rule by family, their own organisation would, in turn, become dominated 
by the Talabani family and in the future Kurdistan would emerge from the competition 
between these two familial groupings. Following the death of Mullah Mustafa Barzani in 
1979, his son, Masoud, assumed the leadership of the KDP, a role he still holds. 
The position of power that the KDP came to hold within Iraqi Kurdistan, which later 
they would again turn into economic advantage, is built on their positioning in the long 
struggle for autonomy. In this struggle, Mullah Mustafa Barzani became the ‘father of the 
nation’ bestowing legitimacy on the KDP. While this singular narrative is challenged by the 
formation of the PUK, it is never entirely removed. The KDP is legitimised by its historic 
struggle. 
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The state in Kurdistan: divided governance 
The 1970s was a period of rapid economic modernisation within Iraq. The nationalisation 
of the oil sector had arrived prior to two major spikes in the price of oil. Iraq had been 
able to invest in public goods because of its oil wealth through most of its modern history, 
but the growth in the 1970s was quantitatively different. The new wealth allowed the state 
to implement large-scale development projects. Provision for education and health care 
improved; electrification projects reached out to villages; transport infrastructure was 
expanded; telecommunications was upgraded; there was state-led industrialisation; and 
large-scale housing projects were built. Amongst developing nations, Iraq was ‘a relatively 
strong state, an elaborate bureaucracy and a government that because of its expanding 
oil income was relatively autonomous from society’ (Leezenberg 2005: 63). 
The increase in national oil revenue had a mixed impact on the economic outlook 
for Kurdistan. The new money coming into the national economy allowed for the expansion 
of the state. Kurdistan was not immune from these changes and there was a dramatic 
growth in either direct or one-stage removed government employment. However, the 
investment that came with oil production was limited to the sites of production. In the 
north of the country, this was mostly concentrated in Kirkuk. Iraqi government industrial 
projects that sought to diversify away from oil production were mostly located outside of 
the Kurdistan region. Official figures in 1987 stated that only 4.9 per cent of Iraq’s heavy 
industry was in Kurdistan. In 1990 the region only contained nine ‘major factories’ with 
these concentrating on the production of cement and cigarettes (Leezenberg 2002: 290). 
The most productive sector of the economy in Kurdistan had been agriculture. In 1980, it 
was still producing nearly half of the wheat in Iraq (Stansfield 2003: 42), but agriculture 
by this point was in decline. Its previous dominance was affected by the growth in urban 
employment which drew agricultural workers away from the land and the new prosperity 
which enabled Iraq to import foodstuffs. Oil wealth had resulted in an economic settlement 
in Kurdistan that was ‘overwhelmingly agrarian in terms of employment, but dependent 
financially upon the distribution of oil revenue’ (Stansfield 2003: 44). 
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Thus, the Kurdistan region was already struggling with structural imbalance. These 
economic problems worsened when Saddam Hussein assumed the presidency of Iraq. A 
decade of conflict followed. War with Iran halted the oil revenue that had expanded the 
Iraqi state through the 1970s and the genocidal Anfal campaign, beginning in 1988, 
dispersed and destroyed the rural communities that maintained the agrarian economy 
within Iraqi Kurdistan. This dislocation within Kurdistan meant the centres that survived 
were now more dependent on the state to maintain economic activity. Almost immediately 
after the Anfal campaign ceased, Iraq was once again plunged into economic turmoil as 
UN sanctions were imposed following the annexation of Kuwait in August 1990.  
The economic and physical destruction that the Gulf War visited on Iraq after 1990 
provided the starting point for the development of the present-day KRG. When the Kurdish 
‘safe haven’ was established through a combination of internal agitation and external 
intervention the economic prospects were terrible. As noted, the agricultural sector had 
been badly disrupted by the Anfal campaign. In addition to this, the Kurdistan region was 
now cut off from central government funding as it lived through the period of dual 
sanctions: referring to both international sanctions imposed on Iraq by the UN and internal 
sanctions imposed on Kurdistan by Saddam’s government in Baghdad. Government 
employment in Kurdistan, that had accounted for much of the economic activity, gave way 
to a period when the state had a limited role in the economy, allowing for a private informal 
sector to emerge (Stansfield 2003: 57).  
The most notable political development at this time was that the groups attempting 
to re-establish government in Northern Iraq chose to hold elections to decide on the 
composition of the new assembly for Kurdistan. This was an innovation for Iraq and for 
much of the Middle East. Elections were held in May 1992 and voting was dominated by 
the two nationalist parties, the KDP and the PUK. The elections were rudimentary but seen 
as fair. The result ended in a rough fifty-fifty split between the KDP and PUK. Where the 
introduction of elections had produced a degree of transparency, what followed would set 
the template for future politics. Without a clear victor, government posts were shared out 
between the two parties. The leaders of the two parties, Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, 
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did not take up positions in government. The two were the most powerful political actors 
in Iraqi Kurdistan and the most visible representatives of the region internationally. Yet 
neither held government posts. Power in the new Kurdistan would remain within the hands 
of the political parties rather than any new institutions that would be established. 
Government posts divided between the two parties became centres of power and 
patronage. When the haggling was completed, government posts reflected the 
geographical spread of support for the two parties: the KDP in control of the western half 
of the region and the PUK in charge of its eastern sector.  
Cut off from the rest of Iraq and having no official international status, the economy 
subsisted on smuggling, with petroleum products being the most profitable sector. The 
KDP was left in control of the more lucrative crossing between Kurdistan and Turkey, while 
the PUK controlled the border with Iran. Some of the income from the smuggling operation 
went to the Kurdistan Central Bank, but in addition to this, the two parties also took their 
share of the duties being charged (Leezenberg 2002: 307). Both parties sought to 
maximise their revenues from the smuggling routes and disputes over who controlled 
which routes were part of the basis for a civil war between the two, that began in 1994 
and continued at different levels of intensity through much of the rest of the decade 
(Graham-Brown 1999: 225). At various times Baghdad and Tehran interfered and it took 
the efforts of the United States to bring settlement between the KDP and PUK. The conflict 
eased when Kurdistan was effectively divided into ‘two one-party statelets under the 
control of the KDP and the PUK, respectively’ (Leezenberg 2005: 632). 
This settlement only strengthened the role of the parties in the economic process, 
undermining the possibility of stronger institutions emerging from the centre of the new 
state. This tendency was reinforced by the main international economic input in this new 
settlement, humanitarian aid. Conforming to the norms of the times, humanitarian 
agencies sought out NGOs rather than state bodies to deliver aid. The practice pushed 
more funds into groups linked with either the KDP or the PUK. More funds flowed in after 
the UN Oil-for-Food Programme was agreed in 1995, guaranteeing the Kurdish region a 
13 per cent share of humanitarian aid coming into Iraq from limited oil sales. While it took 
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time for the practice to match the promised funds, when the additional aid eventually 
reached Kurdistan it proved beneficial to the local economy (Aziz 2015: 12). What was 
beneficial for the economy, was inevitably beneficial for the political parties. This enabled 
the political parties to act as state-like bodies, collecting tax, distributing aid, and 
maintaining security. The safe havens period created a ‘bubble’ for the establishment and 
embedding of what has become today’s Kurdistan economy. 
By the end of the 1990s, finance was entering the Kurdistan region and circulating 
through formal and informal structures. Revenue from the informal economy flowed 
towards the political parties and towards the ‘individuals high up in the party hierarchies’ 
(Leezenberg 2002: 308). The period between 1991 and 2003 had at times been 
economically precarious for the Kurdistan region, but as the period came to an end this 
was no longer the case. In 2004, the population of the Kurdistan region enjoyed a per 
capita income that was approximately 25 per cent higher than anywhere else in Iraq (Aziz 
2015: 13). 
The development of the Kurdistan region during the period after 1991 resulted in 
a complex settlement. During this time there was more entrepreneurialism in Kurdistan 
than was witnessed elsewhere in Iraq. However, much of this entrepreneurial activity was 
connected to and controlled by the parties of government. Therefore, we must 
acknowledge and bring into the analysis that the market is influenced by the society that 
hosts it: ‘Man’s [sic] economy is, as a rule, submerged in his social relations’ (Polanyi 
1969: 65). 
Polanyi is useful to consider the complex socio-political network that makes up the 
functioning of a modern economy. He reminds us that economic relations are the result of 
cultural legacy, shared history and societal relations, and thus understanding economic 
development demands also understanding social and political developments. Nowhere is 
this more evident than in his focus on the sway of catallactic logic—the science of 
exchanges—within a substantive meaning of the economy where trade and money are 
functions of the market forming a conceptual triad to argue that ‘the human economy is 
an instituted process’ (Polanyi 1953/1959: 168). In Kurdistan, business is carried out 
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between companies because of familial or political allegiance and these social and political 
structures thus become instrumental to the establishment and strengthening of economic 
structures. The market in Kurdistan, as we have seen, has been shaped by recent and 
distant history. The nationalist movement is dominated by tribal groups. Political 
competition is created by the break-up of the dominant grouping to create a political 
settlement that has two dynastic families. When these competing forces join to control the 
Kurdistan region, they inherit a broken system of governance that allows them to insert 
themselves into the state beyond the reach of government. They also insert themselves 
into economic activity. 
As the next section will further explain, even when contemporary economic activity 
takes place, carried out by the new entrepreneurs of Kurdistan, it is ‘embedded’ in society. 
Or, as Polanyi more elegantly puts it: ‘instead of economy being embedded in social 
relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system’ (Polanyi 1944/1957: 57). 
 
After 2003: capitalism with Kurdish characteristics 
The end of Saddam Hussein’s regime in spring 2003 was a period of opportunity for the 
region after decades of oppressive rule from Baghdad. The KDP and PUK started to play a 
significant role in shaping the political settlement for post-Saddam Iraq. It was important 
for the Kurdistan leadership to protect the autonomy that they had gained after 1991. The 
removal of Saddam Hussein from power would not result in the KRG being reincorporated 
into the Iraqi state. When the constitution settlement was reached in 2005, it was for a 
federal Iraq where governorates could link up and rule with significant freedom in their 
defined territory. At present this right has only been exercised by the KRG. 
In the brief period of American-led statebuilding within Iraq, Kurdistan remained 
largely untouched by any attempts at reshaping government or economic structures. If 
the United States did entertain serious plans to restructure Iraq, these were soon 
undermined by instability in the rest of the country. The attempts of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) to introduce new business regulations and laws had limited 
impact when applied to commerce in Iraq and it is difficult to discern any significant impact 
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in the Kurdistan region. In the chaotic aftermath of regime change, Kurdistan was soon 
looked on as an area of calm. There were no significant security problems within the region 
and unlike the rest of the state, the governance structures that had existed before March 
2003 remained in place. The occupying forces could send the Kurdistan region its monthly 
budget, confident that the money would be spent and services would be provided to the 
population. The period of CPA oversight built on the investments of the UN Oil-for-Food 
period and, thus, Kurdistan emerged as a new centre of prosperity in modern Iraq. 
The period immediately after regime change was therefore important politically and 
economically. The political leadership solidified the gains made during the ‘safe haven’ 
decade and the Kurdistan region benefited from the increased funding that came from the 
lifting of UN sanctions and the newfound ability to encourage international investment. 
Elections held in Iraqi Kurdistan in 2005 rewarded the two established parties. In 2006, 
the KRG began drawing up new investment laws that would be more generous than those 
found elsewhere in Iraq. Iraqi Kurdistan marketed itself as a gateway to investment in the 
rest of Iraq labelling the regional capital, Erbil, as ‘the new Dubai’ (Hamid 2012). 
But much as this political stability and economic growth built on the achievements 
of the period of autonomy in the 1990s, they also inherited some of the weaknesses of 
that period. Soon after the introduction of the new investment laws aimed at foreign 
companies it was noted that business in the Kurdistan region still depended ‘heavily on 
party affiliations and connections’ (Khalil 2009: 34). In 2015, the anti-corruption NGO 
Transparency International noted that while levels of corruption in Iraqi Kurdistan where 
lower than in Iraq, they remained higher in comparison with other states in the region. 
The dominance of the political parties in Kurdistan created, ‘risks of nepotism and 
clientelism based on political party affiliation, tribal kinship and/or family connections’ 
(Pring 2015). The business laws of 2006 resulted in significant investment in the region 
and, between 2006 and 2013, infrastructure projects brought more than $30 billion to 
Kurdistan. However, much of the money has, ‘reportedly been awarded to those close to 
the dominant political parties’ (Sahin 2015: 102). 
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There were many examples of the role that the political parties played in everyday 
commerce but possibly the most obvious came in the telecommunications market where 
the KDP and PUK ran rival mobile phone networks. Kurdish businessman Faruk Mustafa 
Rasool began his Asiacell telecommunications company in the 1990s when he smuggled 
the components for a mobile phone network into the Kurdistan Region. An early investor 
in Rasool was the PUK, which saw that a successful communications firm would allow 
Sulaymaniyah to contact the rest of the world. The extent of the PUK investment is a 
source of conjecture with figures ranging from 3 to 20 per cent (Wall Street Journal, 2007). 
The rival phone network in the KDP sector, Korek Telecom, disputed Asiacell’s claim to be 
the pioneer of mobile services in the region. However, as with their Sulaymaniyah rival, 
close party ties where apparent. The chair of the company is Sirwan Barzani, ‘the nephew 
of Masoud Barzani, the KRG president and KDP leader’ (Hamid 2012).  
While both can claim to have led the way in bringing mobile communications to 
Iraq, a vital service in a nation recovering from conflict and with a disrupted infrastructure, 
they failed to enable Iraqi Kurds to communicate directly between their two largest cities, 
with Asiacell blocked in Erbil and Korek locked out of Sulaymaniyah. Plotting the 
emergence of the Kurdistan state, Lawrence noted that, while this dispute was ‘probably 
not the dirtiest . . . in Kurdistan, just the most obvious,’ before adding, the prominence of 
the Barzani name highlighted the involvement of the KDP in questionable business 
practice. The PUK was just as responsible for problematic dealings, ‘but with more than 
one family name in the party, it looked less obvious’ (Lawrence 2008: 305). 
With the political parties acting as strategic investors in the economy, it was not 
surprising that they should be linked with Iraq’s most significant resource: oil. As has been 
noted, during the time of the safe haven, Iraqi Kurdistan survived through smuggling oil 
products. The most lucrative route, via Turkey, was controlled by the KDP. In 2002, the 
leadership of the PUK moved beyond smuggling into the realm of oil production, 
encouraging Turkish businessman Mehmet Sepil to take on the Taq Taq oil field located to 
the west of Sulaymaniyah, the main city within the eastern PUK controlled sector. The 
choice of Sepil was notable because he was not from an established oil company but 
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instead the head of a construction firm. This selection of an industry outsider to begin the 
extraction of oil in Kurdistan may well have been a reflection of the questionable legal 
status of such a project. An established international oil company would have been wary 
of striking a deal with what, at the time, was a non-state body. Sepil, however, went ahead 
established a new company, Genel Enerji, and agreed to a Product Sharing Contract (PSC) 
with the PUK (Hurriyet Daily News 2012). 
The PUK had been the first party to move into oil production, but it was not the 
last. From 2006, the KDP began to play a significant role in the further exploitation of the 
resource as the KRG sought to encourage oil exploration in the territory. Appointed in May 
2006, the Natural Resources Minister for the KRG, Ashti Hawrami, was aligned with the 
KDP (Mills 2016: 8). Hawrami successfully used PSCs to encourage international oil 
companies to invest in the potential of Kurdistan, dividing the territory up into a series of 
exploration blocks. Mills notes that this economic success was linked to politics. ‘The KDP’s 
control over the oil portfolio has been extremely important in increasing its powers versus 
the rival PUK. It makes them the key interlocutors with Turkey and gives them access to 
additional sources of funding and patronage.’ Despite the success of the KRG in attracting 
oil companies into the region, there was little transparency about their dealings, Hawrami 
was subjected ‘to allegations of corruption and mismanagement’ (Mills 2016: 31). 
In 2006, the US Department of State in Kirkuk documented how the different 
components of the KRG interacted. Highlighting ‘corruption’ as the greatest threat to the 
future of the region, the State Department noted that corruption began at the top and 
from the ‘two ruling parties’ and ‘family-clan’ ties (US Department of State 2006). The 
political parties dominated the KRG making ‘judiciary and legislature’ subordinate to their 
rule (US Department of State 2006). Corruption came from ‘the godfathers’, individuals 
with close ties to party leadership and party security forces. This meant that business 
rarely crossed party boundaries, companies would do business in either Erbil, with the 
KDP, or Sulaymaniyah, with the PUK. Without a ‘godfather' it is difficult to do business. In 
Sulaymaniyah, without help, a business would ‘not even receive the tender advertising the 
project’ (US Department of State 2006). The result was an economy dominated by 
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‘vertically integrated cross-sectoral conglomerates’ which were linked to ‘godfathers’ in 
the dominant parties. The State Department identified an array of such conglomerates: 
Diyar Group, Eagle Group, Falcon Group, KAR Group, Nasri Group, Sandi Group, Silver 
Star Group and Ster Group. Signage for these conglomerates could be observed around 
Erbil from hotel sites to business parks to private security companies. This was not by 
chance. The corruption was such that for the companies to succeed they needed to control 
all aspects of business from the import of materials and shipment to construction to 
protection. The burst of construction that was changing the skylines of Kurdistan was the 
result of conglomerates overseen by ‘non-competing “godfathers” in the local ruling party’ 
(US Department of State 2006). 
 
The modern palaces of Kurdistan 
The Iraqi Kurdistan that emerges in the early twenty-first presented a puzzle. Outwardly, 
it is a prosperous enclave benefitting from a sustained period of peace and stability. At 
election times it displayed and still displays a vibrant political culture. However, despite 
this outward display of vibrancy and plurality there appeared to be little possibility of 
change. Political parties may lose popularity, as the PUK did, but they never lost power. 
Deciphering Kurdistan through Polanyi offers new openings for analysis. Starting 
with the observation that ‘normally, the economic order is merely a function of the social 
order' (Polanyi 1944/1957: 71) The modern territory of Kurdistan can trace its history to 
the uprising against Saddam Hussein in 1991. This presented a unique set of 
circumstances in which to construct governance and economic structures. But the KRG did 
not begin in 1991, it was the culmination of a long historical process. The political actors 
that took control following the uprising owed their legitimacy and position to the history 
of Kurdish nationalism that stretched back to the early twentieth century. This history had 
built networks of influence and security forces that were loyal to them. It had established 
social orders that had withstood the wars of Saddam Hussein and the genocidal Anfal 
campaign. This social order was replicated in the economic development that would follow 
the creation of the safe haven for the Iraqi Kurds. 
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Polanyi, therefore, provides a basic starting point for analysis. But there are some 
limitations. The hope that Polanyi holds out that a ‘double movement’ will occur and society 
will protect itself from the perils inherent in a free market (Polanyi, 1944/1957: 76) is 
difficult to envisage within the economic setting of Kurdistan. Here, the insights of Ayubi 
are worth repeating. The structures of the state in the Arab world bring power to the 
centre. Those who attain power devise strategies to maintain it, alternate voices can only 
challenge the state through confrontation rather than through the ‘orderly process of 
aggregating demands.' As Ayubi highlights in this process of state formation, ‘classes [are] 
excessively dependent on the state’ (Ayubi 1995: 25). Success and advancement in 
Kurdistan is an outcome that is influenced by proximity to the leadership of the two 
dominant political groupings. 
While the ‘double movement’ thesis may struggle with the reality of Kurdistan, 
Polanyi’s research of the pre-modern economy of Mesopotamia provides a new way of 
thinking about the development of the economy in the territory after Saddam. The KRG 
emerges from a rare confluence of circumstances in 1991. The region was effectively 
isolated from international trade and national interaction through a regime of double 
sanctions. The economy survived through smuggling and humanitarian aid. Both streams 
of income were controlled by the dominant political parties. The territory established new 
governance structures, but power and wealth resided outside of these in parallel 
institutions linked to the political parties. A civil war between the KDP and PUK, in 1994, 
formalised the geographical division of the territory and enhanced the power of the parties 
over their separate enclaves. 
It was during this period that the actions of the two parties began to show some 
similarities to the ‘temples and palaces complexes' analysed by Polanyi. The palaces 
commanded a significant role in the pre-modern economy. They established the terms of 
trade which enabled competitive exchange and interactions that were guided by ‘custom 
and treaty’. More interestingly, for the development of Kurdistan, the pre-modern palaces 
existed outside of the subsistence sector the economy. The palaces produced economic 
surplus. The surplus was reinvested in the economy either for the public good or private 
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gain. Echoes of this could be found in the emerging economy of Iraqi Kurdistan where the 
political parties were closely linked to new business. The relative isolation of the Kurdistan 
territory from the global economy was an additional advantage. The political parties 
maintained significant control over access to the territory and its economy, putting them 
in an advantageous position to broker deals and to gain benefit.  
When regime change brought an end to rule by Saddam Hussein, the structures 
established in times of scarcity benefitted as the global political economy explored 
investment opportunities in ‘the other Iraq’. Returning to the palaces and temples 
complexes described by Polanyi and Oppenheim, Hudson argues that they represented a 
form of privatisation of public wealth. The palaces created the environment for the 
entrepreneurs, but these private actors owed their opportunities either to their position 
within the ruling elites or to their close ties to them. The palaces brought progress, but 
the cost of this is an economy that revolves around societal relations. The risk in this mode 
of development is ‘corruption [that] underpinned a privatisation process that was initiated 
and propelled by ruling families, warlords and other powerful individuals at the apex of the 
social pyramid’ (Dale 2010: 160 quoting Hudson). 
It is difficult not to detect echoes in the contemporary palaces of Kurdistan. The 
structures established in Iraqi Kurdistan during the period of relative isolation have been 
engorged by foreign investment and ‘these shifts have helped develop the region'. But this 
development has also ‘led to extreme social inequalities [and] rampant corruption at the 
highest levels’ (Hassan 2015). Polanyi forces us to consider the relationships between 
society, economics and politics. Kurdistan, with its complex interweaving of the personal 
and political and the public and the private, provides a compelling case study. 
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